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Abstract
Firms in various markets such as health care, nancial services, software, consumer goods etc.
spend signicant amount of money on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. The
literature suggests that consumers take into consideration rmsCSR activities when making
purchase decisions and this leads to either an increase in willingness to pay or an increase in
purchase intention. Unfortunately, notwithstanding its strategic benets, the empirical ndings
regarding the impact of CSR on rmsnancials are mixed. In this paper we explore when and
why investing in CSR can have positive or negative impact on rms protability. In doing so
we model two types of CSR (i.e., company ability relevant CSR (CSR-CA) and company ability
irrelevant CSR (CSR-NCA)) and allow rms to choose which one to pursue if they decide to
invest in CSR, and incorporate the indirect e¤ect of CSR through contrast e¤ect (that can be
positive or negative) on consumersutility, which has been ignored by the extant literature. Our
analysis reveals the conditions under which it is optimal to invest in CSR and of what type.
Then, we extend our analysis by investigating whether being the rst mover in investing in CSR
increases the protability and whether competitively advantaged (disadvantaged) rm benets
more from CSR.
(Corporate Social Responsibility; Competition; Contrast E¤ect)
1 Introduction
Firms in various markets such as health care, nancial services, software, consumer goods etc.
spend signicant amount of money on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Recently
Financial Times has reported that the fortune 500 companies have spent more than $15 billion on
CSR, this spending has come in various forms such as donating free drugs (Johnson & Johnson),
giving free software (Oracle), investing in educational programs in developing countries (Pru-
dential) or creating a more productive work environment for various minority groups (Chicago
Fed). We have also seen that large business corporations like Microsoft in recent years have
spent more than 900 million US dollars on CSR related activities. The 2014 CSR reputation
studyobserves that globally increasing number of companies are investing in CSR as consumers
prefer companies with good CSR reputations. The study suggests that eighty nine percent of
consumers are willing to recommend companies with excellent CSR reputation as opposed to
only six percent who are willing to recommend companies with average CSR reputation.
The literature suggests that consumers take into consideration rmsCSR activities when
making purchase decisions and this leads to either an increase in willingness to pay or an increase
in purchase intention (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004; Creyer and Ross, 1997; Pen Schoen Berland,
2010). In a recent global survey conducted by Nielsen, fty percent of 29,000 respondents across
58 countries were found to be willing to pay more for the products and services developed by
companies that invest in CSR. More importantly, 43 percent of these consumers actually paid
substantially higher prices for products and services developed by the companies which have
implemented some sort of CSR agenda.
CSR programs can be costly and also compete for rmslimited nancial resources for other
marketing activities such as new product development and advertising. Naturally, rms are con-
cerned about the nancial impact of CSR. Unfortunately, notwithstanding its strategic benets,
the empirical ndings regarding the impact of CSR on rmsnancials are mixed (Margolis
et al., 2009; Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Several reasons have been suggested for this outcome.
Di¤erent studies have used di¤erent measures for rmsnancial performance and for rmsCSR
performance or focused on di¤erent dimensions of CSR. Some researchers claim that many of
the studies investigating the nancial impact of CSR ignore the indirect link between CSR and
rmsnancials that is through the e¤ect of CSR on consumersattitudes and behavior towards
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rmsproducts or omitting important control variables such as R&D that may in fact mediate
the relationship between CRS and rm nancials. Another possible factor which prevents CSR
from increasing prot is misalignment of interests of di¤erent stakeholder groups. If rms choose
CSR activities that consumers do not appreciate but consider it as an opportunity cost then
CSR would not have the intended impact on the nancials of the rms. Trudel and Cotte (2009)
however show that this would rarely be the case as consumers by and large are willing to pay
substantially higher prices for CSR products. Therefore, this explanation is at best weak.
In this paper, we propose a much more nuanced explanation for when and why investing in
CSR can have positive or negative impact on rms protability, which also provides a roadmap
to the managers to invest e¢ ciently in CSR. First, there are mainly two types of CSR: company
ability relevant CSR (CSR-CA) and company ability irrelevant CSR (CSR-NCA). An example
of CSR-CA would be investing in wellness training for employees or on an on-site daycare which
would enhance the e¢ ciency of the employees. Investing in building homes for the underprivileged
in Haiti would be an example of CSR-NCA. There are many examples to both types of CSR.
Ben and Jerrys for example has implemented fair trade norms in their production and created
a dairy farm sustainability program which would eventually enhance companys performance
and perhaps bring in better quality product. On the other hand, we have companies like Toms
shoes which donate a pair of shoes to a child every time a customer purchases its product 
clearly this is a CSR strategy which would not improve company ability per se.1 Consumers
willingness to pay for a rms products increases when they observe the rm invest in CSR,
of either type. But, when a rm invests in CSR-CA, it helps to improve the rms R&D and
manufacturing capabilities, which in turn increases the rms success probability in new product
development (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001). On the other hand, CSR-NCA does not inuence
corporate ability. A recent article by Rangan et al. (2015) discusses how rmsactivities are
divided among di¤erent theatres of practice- while some rms use the CSR activities to focus
on philanthropy, others utilize the CSR opportunity to improve their operational e¤ectiveness.
When a rm invests in CSR-CA, the e¢ ciency and e¤ectiveness of its employees increases which
in turn increases the R&D and/or manufacturing capability. As a consequence, consumers now
expect the rms new product to be of higher quality. Due to this increased quality expectation
the consumers now derive less utility from the rms new product. This e¤ect of consumers
1Please see http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4679-corporate-social-responsibility.html.
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perception of the corporate ability on the product evaluation is known as the contrast e¤ect
in the behavioral literature. Therefore, unlike CSR-NCA, CSR-CA has two conicting e¤ects
on consumer utility. While the direct e¤ect (i.e., willing to pay extra for the product which is
produced by a rm that invests in CSR) is positive, the indirect e¤ect (i.e., the contrast e¤ect)
is negative. When a rm is deciding whether to invest in CSR, it should also consider what kind
of CSR to pursue and how its decision will a¤ect its R&D and manufacturing capabilities and
as a result consumerswillingness to pay for its new product. This implies that if a rm ignores
the indirect e¤ect of CSR it may make an ine¢ cient CSR decision, which can lead to reduced
prots.
In this research, we specically address the following questions: 1. Under what conditions is
it optimal to invest in CSR and of what type?, 2. Does being the rst mover in investing in
CSR increase the protability?, and 3. Which rm benets more from CSR, the competitively
advantaged or the competitively disadvantaged one? For this, we construct an analytical model
in which there are two rms, with asymmetric R&D capabilities, working on developing a new
product. Each rm has a xed budget to spend either on pure R&D or on a CSR activity.
If a rm chooses to invest in CSR then it also has to choose whether to pursue CSR-CA or
CSR-NCA. First, the focal rm chooses its CSR strategy followed by the rivals choice of its
CSR strategy. Firms then simultaneously set prices of their new products. If a rm chooses to
invest in CSR, consumerswillingness to pay for the rms new product increases. Furthermore,
if a rm chooses to invest in either CSR-CA or in pure R&D (NCSR) then its R&D capability
improves and, given the uncertain nature of R&D, the probability of the rm developing the new
product increases. The investment in pure R&D (NCSR) is not observable to the consumers but,
the investment in CSR-CA by the rm is visible to consumers. Hence, consumers become aware
of this improvement in the rms R&D capability.
If there is no contrast e¤ect then CSR-CA is the dominant strategy for the focal rm. However,
with the contrast e¤ect present, we nd that depending on whether the rival is able to invest
in CSR, the focal rms R&D capability relative to the rivals, the size of the ratio of the
relative gain from CSR to the relative gain from the contrast e¤ect, and the level of consumers
sensitivity to contrast e¤ect, CSR-NCA or NCSR can also be the optimal strategy for the focal
rm. Interestingly, we observe that when the focal rm is less capable in R&D than the rival,
under certain conditions it prefers to spend its resources not to improve its R&D capabilities and
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increase its chance to successfully develop the new product, but to invest in CSR-NCA while the
rival invests in CSR-CA or NCSR. Our results reveal that the rm can strategically use CSR
to alter both the consumersand its rivals behavior (i.e., the decision of whether to invest in
CSR and if so, in which type of CSR). Furthermore, by conducting a behavioral experiment we
provide support to the existence of contrast e¤ect in the CSR context and show that consumers
new product evaluations are lower when a company engages in company ability related CSR
than when a company engages in company ability irrelevant CSR.
Finally, we investigate whether being the rst mover in investing in CSR increases the prof-
itability and whether the competitively advantaged or the competitively disadvantaged rm
benets more from CSR. We nd that being the rst mover in investing in CSR increases the
protability only if the optimal strategy is to pursue CSR-CA (i.e., being rst mover in CSR
investment is not always more protable). When being rst mover in investing in CSR-CA is
more protable, the rst mover can earn higher prots than its rival even if it has a lower R&D
capability than the rival. Therefore, by being the rst mover in investing in CSR-CA, a rm
can overcome its competitive disadvantage. We also nd that the competitively disadvantaged
rm (i.e., the rm which is less capable in R&D than its rival) benets from CSR more than the
competitively advantaged rm.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss how our
work is related to the extant literature. We lay out the model setup in Section 3 and examine in
Section 4 the benchmark case in which the rival cannot invest in CSR. In Section 5 we solve for
the case in which both rms can invest in CSR. In Section 6 we explain our behavioral experiment
and discuss its results. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the results and concludes the paper with
discussion of future research directions.
2 Literature Review
In recent years a number of papers have shown that CSR may lead to many commercial benets
for the business organizations as well. For example, CSR activities would have positive inuence
on brand/company evaluations, brand choice, brand recommendations, customer satisfaction
and loyalty, customer-rm identication, and consumersattributions in a product-harm crises
situation (Brown and Dacin, 1997; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006;
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Berens et al., 2005; Klein and Dawar, 2004). CSR may directly inuence consumerspurchase
intention, in fact according to Mohr and Webb (2005) CSR activity would have a stronger e¤ect
than price on consumerspurchase intentions.
However, the empirical ndings regarding relationship between CSR and nancial perfor-
mance are mixed. Some nd positive relationship between CSR and rm nancials (Orlitzky
et al., 2003; Beurden and Gossling, 2008; Wu, 2006; Maron, 2006; de Velde et al., 2005; Gregory
et al., 2014), some nd negative relationship (Wright and Ferris, 1997; Gri¢ n and Mahon, 1997;
Brammer et al., 2006), and some nd no signicant relationship (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000;
Seifert et al., 2003, 2004; Moore, 2001; Soana, 2011). There are also studies that identify mixed
relationship between CSR and rm nancials. Specically, Inoue and Lee (2011) conrm that
various CSR dimensions like attention to community or attention to environment and diversity
either negatively a¤ect airline rmsnancial performance or do not have any positive e¤ect.
More importantly, this paper shows that the e¤ect of CSR may vary across di¤erent CSR dimen-
sions the same airline rms may see positive e¤ect of CSR on their nancial performance as
long as we measure CSR on product dimension. The research insight from this paper suggests
that aggregation methodology (i.e. how we develop a composite measurement of CSR based on
multiple dimensions) would have a critical role to play in this context. Moreover, there exist
a substantial number of papers which di¤erentiate between company ability relevant CSR and
company ability irrelevant CSR. Bauman and Skitka (2012) suggest that some form of CSR can
provide employees with sense of security, feelings of belongingness, self-esteem and a deeper sense
of purpose at work, all of which would eventually make them more productive. Bhattacharya
et al. (2008) further argue that companies often use CSR as internal marketing lever which in
turn help the managers to understand and fulll employee needs - this kind of CSR is certainly
related to overall company ability. Some concrete examples in this regard have been provided by
Mirvis (2012) - supply chain practices that respect the workers who actually make the products
or HIV/AIDS initiatives that protects employees or creating a results only work environment
(ROWE) which gives employee exibility in managing work and personal time are all examples
of company ability relevant CSR. Bhattacharya et al. (2014) explain that CSR is one of the
most innovative ways to motivate frontline employees (i.e. customer service representatives) in
delivering superior client services. The authors for example believe that when companies invest
in o¤ering ethically made products, it not only enhances the brand image of the company itself
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but also helps the frontline employees to disseminate product related information to customers
in a more e¤ective fashion. Many companies purposefully bring in skill-enhancing CSR elements,
as per Shen and Benson (2014) when companies take account of employees social contribution in
promotion, performance appraisal and remuneration they basically invest in CSR-CA. This prac-
tice obviously enhances employee performance but also helps the employees to build a distinct
organizational identity. Given the importance of CSR dimensions, these papers clearly justify
further categorization of CSR activities (i.e. CSR-NCA vs. CSR-CA).
As summarized in the review paper Margolis et al. (2009), across a total of 251 papers there
is a mildly positive relationship such that the median and weighted average e¤ect size of CSR on
rm nancials is lower than the mean e¤ect size. Thus, the mean is inated by large e¤ect sizes of
a small number of studies that used relatively small sample of companies. It has been suggested
that this conicting outcome in the literature may be caused by focusing on di¤erent dimensions
of CSR and omitting important control variables. For example, McWilliams and Siegel (2000)
and Surroca et al. (2010) show that when one includes rmsR&D capabilities into the analysis
the relationship between CSR and rm nancials becomes insignicant. Given this confusion in
the empirical ndings, Margolis et al. (2009) suggest that future research needs to establish the
causal mechanism between CSR and rms nancial, and characterize the conditions under which
rms should engage in CSR and how to do it e¤ectively. There is recent empirical work that
embarks on explaining the mixed results in the literature by suggesting a mediation mechanism
between CSR and rms nancials. Surroca et al. (2010) empirically show that there is no direct
e¤ect of CSR on a rms nancials. Firmsintangible assets such as R&D, human resources, and
brand value mediate the relationship between CSR and the rms nancials. Specically, when
a rm invests in CSR this may either improve (sometimes even destroy) its R&D capability,
human resources, and brand value, which in turn a¤ects positively (or negatively) its nancials.
Luo and Bhattacharya (2006) show that customer satisfaction mediates the e¤ect of CSR on
the market value and this e¤ect can be positive or negative depending on the rms corporate
capability (i.e., innovation capability).
While there are various empirical papers that investigate whether CSR has positive or negative
impact on nancial performance, there are fewer analytical papers that study when and why
investing in CSR is protable. Becchetti et al. (2014) suggests that when consumers social
responsibility does not grow as per rms ethical capital, the optimal strategy for the rms would
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be to compete on price and not on CSR investment. Baron (2001) nds that when competition is
high (i.e., product di¤erentiation is low) few rms would invest in CSR at the equilibrium. In this
case, as product di¤erentiation decreases, so does the disutility of not investing in CSR. Similarly,
Bagnoli andWatts (2003) nd that when the degree of price competition is quite high, CSR would
invariably reduce the protability of the rms. In more recent studies, Baron (2009) argues that
even when consumers are willing to reward all rms for their socially responsible performance,
di¤erent rms may realize di¤erent magnitudes of CSP (Corporate Social Performance) related
social pressure and Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (2009) nd that mostly when consumers
own social consciousness increases, the prot of a socially responsible rm goes up. Krishna
and Rajan (2009) rst experimentally show that consumers obtain both a direct utility from
purchasing a product linked to a cause and also obtain a spillover utility from purchasing other
non-cause-marketed products in the rms portfolio. Then, by building a duopoly model in
which each rm has two products, the authors show that without spillover e¤ect rms will have
both products on cause marketing unless the cost of cause marketing is too high. However, with
spillover e¤ect rms will have only one of their product on cause marketing and hence, avoid
head-to-head competition in cause marketing. This way rms increase their prots from cause
marketing. Finally, very recently Iyer and Soberman (2015) investigate the relationship between
consumerssocial comparison benets/costs and rmsincentive to invest in R&D which makes
their product more socially responsible. A consumer derives a social comparison benet when
he interacts with another consumer who consumes less socially responsible product and incurs a
social comparison cost when he interact with someone who consumers more socially responsible
product. Authors show that when economic value of the product is low (high), incentive to
innovate in order to make the product more socially responsible decreases (increases) as social
comparison e¤ects increase.
In this paper, di¤erent from the extant analytical work, we develop an analytical model which
incorporates the two types of CSR activities (company ability relevant CSR and company ability
irrelevant CSR), the indirect e¤ect of CSR on consumersutility (i.e., the contrast e¤ect), and the
link between CSR and the rms R&D capability (i.e., the mediating role of R&D between CSR
and protability) as suggested by the recent empirical work. In fact, the way we model the rms
R&D capability can also capture the positive e¤ect of CSR on human resources. As suggested
by the literature (see Surroca et al. (2010)) when a rm engages in a CSR activity that improves
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the working conditions, it in turn improves the employeesproductivity and hence the rms
product/process innovation capabilities as well. We believe that our model, by incorporating the
recent ndings of the empirical literature on CSR, enables us to perform a more comprehensive
analysis of when rms should invest in CSR and if so then which type of CSR they should pursue.
3 Model Setup
There are two rms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) producing identical products from which consumers
derive utility v. Both rms are working on developing a new product with an extra quality .
With probability x (y) Firm 1 (Firm 2) will be successful in its R&D e¤orts and develop the
new product: Consumers currently have a working-condition old product manufactured by one
of the rms and their willingness to pay for extra quality is equal to one.
Each rm receives a xed R&D endowment, which they can spend to increase their new prod-
uct development success probability. However, Firm 1 is allowed to spend its R&D budget to do
CSR as well. If it prefers to do so it can choose between two types of CSR; company ability rele-
vant CSR (CSR-CA) or company ability irrelevant CSR (CSR-NCA). If Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA
then it improves its R&D capability as well and as a result its new product development success
probability increases to one. If Firm 1 pursues CSR-NCA strategy then its R&D capability does
not change. If Firm 1 prefers not to do CSR, but spends the money for pure R&D (we call this
strategy NCSR) then the companys R&D capability increases to one.
The game proceeds as follows. At t=1 Firm 1 decides whether to do CSR and if so what
kind of CSR. At t=2 rmsR&D outcomes are realized and they simultaneously set their prices.
Finally, at t=3 consumers make their purchasing decision and the game ends. We assume that
manufacturing cost for both the old products and the new products is equal to zero. Figure 1
depicts the timeline.
Figure 1: Timeline of The Game
Firm 1 decides whether
to pursues CSR









Next, we explain how we model consumersutility functions under each strategy (i.e., CSR-CA,
CSR-NCA, and NCSR). We build our utility function based on the ndings of the experimental
work in the consumer behavior literature and CSR literature. There are both direct and indirect
e¤ect of CSR on consumersevaluation of a product. The direct e¤ect is positive-i.e., consumers
willingness to pay for the product increases due to CSR activity being performed by the rm. On
the other hand, CSR can also have a negative indirect e¤ect on consumersproduct evaluation via
contrast e¤ect. According to consumer behavior literature, as consumersjudgment standard
(attitude) in price and quality changes their product evaluation would also change as a result of
contrast e¤ect. Specically, as the discrepancy between the judgment standard and the product
performance in quality and price increases the evaluation of the product becomes more favorable
(less favorable) if the discrepancy is positive (negative) (see Lynch et al. (1991)). As the mag-
nitude of discrepancy increases so does the distortion in the product evaluation. In his work on
product line extensions, Kim (2006) shows that due to the contrast e¤ect a moderately typical
product extension (such as mediocre quality and medium price) from a favorable manufacturer
(such a high quality and high price) often receives lower evaluations than the same product
from an unfavorable manufacturer. The author argues that this happens because consumers use
the products that are typically produced by the manufacturers as a standard comparison. In
their work on the e¤ect of CSR on company and product evaluation, Brown and Dacin (1997)
demonstrate that due to the contrast e¤ect when consumers evaluate a product in the context of
low perceived company ability, the product evaluation tends to be high compared to a situation
when the company is perceived to have high ability. However, if a company pursues product
irrelevant-CSR activities then these activities would not a¤ect consumersperception corporate
ability of developing new product and hence, only induce positive direct e¤ect on the product
evaluations (i.e., this type of CSR activities will not induce contrast e¤ects in consumersproduct
evaluations). In a similar spirit, Biehal and Sheinin (2007) show that corporate ability related
messages are more diagnostic for forming product beliefs than non-corporate ability related CSR
messages. Sen and Bhattacharya (2001) claim that as the companys CSR performance increases
so does the evaluation of the company among the consumers who highly support the CSR do-
main and think that the rms CSR activities are highly relevant to the product evaluations.
The authors experimentally show that as the evaluation of the company becomes more favorable,
as a result of its CSR activities, the presence of contrast e¤ect distorts the purchase intentions
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of these consumers for even a high quality new product. Moreover, all the consumers, regardless
of their expertise, are susceptible to contrast e¤ect. In the light of these experimental works
we model consumersutility function such that it has two components. First component is the
absolute utility consumers derive from the product. This is equal to v +  +    p, where p is
price and  is the increase in consumerswillingness to pay due to CSR activity being performed
by a rm, if a rm invests in CSR and to v+   p if a rm does not invest in CSR. The second
component is the relative utility with respect to consumers judgment of the rms ability to
develop the new product with an extra quality  (i.e., the rms expected R&D capability). This
is equal to (1  expected R&D capability), where  is the sensitivity of product evaluation to
the evaluative context (i.e., consumersjudgment of the rms R&D capability). Note that as the
rms expected R&D capability decreases consumers evaluate the new product more favorably.
In other words, when consumers evaluate the new product in the context of unfavorable corpo-
rate judgment (i.e., low expected R&D capability case), their evaluations are contrasted away
from the context and as a result higher than their evaluations of the same product in the context
of favorable corporate judgment (i.e., high expected R&D capability case). Therefore, in our
model (1   expected R&D capability) represents the contrast e¤ect.2 We would like to note
that in order to provide much solid support to the existence of contrast e¤ect in the context CSR
we conducted a behavioral experiment and showed that consumersnew product evaluations are
lower when a company engages in company ability related CSR than when a company engages
in company ability irrelevant CSR. We discuss our experimental set up and its results in Section
6.
Therefore, if Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA consumers know that the rms R&D capability is
now equal to one and as a result they do not gain from the contrast e¤ect (i.e., expected R&D
capability = 1): On the other hand, if Firm 1 pursues CSR-NCA strategy its R&D capability does
not change and consumers gain (1  x) from the contrast e¤ect. When a rm does not pursue
CSR and invests its money to plain R&D, this does not become as public as investing in CSR,
which is specically done to improve the public opinion about the company and promoted by
the company.3 Firms constantly invest in R&D, by such as hiring more employees or providing
2We conduct our analysis for  < 1 so that the impact of contrast e¤ect on the consumers utility is not larger
than the absolute utility :
3Forexample, every year Lee jeans celebrates Lee national denim day on rst Friday of October and invites
companies to have their employees wear jeans to work one day and donate for breast cancer fund. Procter
& Gambles Oly brand skin-care line partnered with American society for Dermatologic surgery, and it was
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additional training to its employees, and unless the act of investing in R&D is public by its
nature such as merging with or acquiring another company consumers do not become aware of
the investment. In fact, even a merger or an acquisition may not attract attention of an ordinary
consumer, as a CSR action would do, unless it is done with a high prole company. Therefore,
we assume that pure R&D investment is not observable to the consumers and hence if consumers
do not observe the rm investing in any type of CSR (i.e., when the rm invests in pure R&D),
they do not update their prior belief about the rms R&D capability. This means that when the
rms pursue NSCR, consumersgain from the contrast e¤ect is in the amount of (1   x). In
Section 7 we discuss an alternative way of modeling consumersposterior belief about the rms
R&D capability when the rm pursues NCSR as well.
Table 3 lays out consumersutility from Firm 1s new product and from Firm 2s new product
under di¤erent CSR strategies.4 Recall that Firm 2 is allowed to pursue only NCSR.
Table 1: Consumersutility from new products under various CSR strategies
Consumersutility from: NCSR CSR-CA CSR-NCA
Firm 1s new product  +  + (1  x)  p1  +  +    p1  +  + (1  x) +    p1
Firm 2s new product  +  + (1  y)  p2
Let R  

: Note that 

is the relative gain from CSR and 

is the relative gain from the
contrast e¤ect. Therefore, R denotes the ratio of relative gain from CSR to the relative gain
from the contrast e¤ect. Firmsprots are given in Tables 2 to 5 for both case of Firm 1 is more
capable than Firm 2 (i.e., x > y) and case of Firm 1 is less capable than Firm 2 (i.e., x < y).
Case of x > y :
Table 2: Firm 1s Prot When x>y
Firm 1s prot if it pursues:
NCSR CSR-CA CSR-NCA
0    (1  y) if R > (1  y) x(   (x  y)) if R > (x  y)
0 if R < (1  y) 0 if R < (x  y)
widely covered in tv, print and online media. Coca-Cola India Inc.s recent Drops of Joy campaign features
an emotional narrative from one of the 80 men of the Benares Deaf and Dumb Institute who have been given
employment as bottle inspectors at Coca-Colas bottling plant.
4Note that in our model when the rm invests in CSR-NCA, consumers who believe that the rm trades
o¤ R&D capability improvement for CSR-NCA investment do not react less positively and hence do not derive
less utility from the new product. Sen and Bhattacharya (2001) test this hypothesis of whether consumers who
believe that the rm trades o¤ improving its R&D capability for CSR-NCA react less positively to the rms new
product and found no support for such consumer behavior. That is why we ignore it in our model as well.
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Recall that Firm 2 can only pursue NCSR.
Table 3: Firm 2s Prot When x>y
Firm 2s prot if Firm 1 pursues:
NCSR CSR-CA CSR-NCA
(x  y) (1  y)   if R < (1  y) (1  x)(1 + (1  y)) + x((x  y)  ) if R < (x  y)
0 if R > (1  y) (1  x)(1 + (1  y)) if R > (x  y)
Case of y > x :
Table 4: Firm 1s Prots When y>x
Firm 1s prot if it pursues:
NCSR CSR-CA CSR-NCA
(y   x)    (1  y) if R > (1  y) x( + (y   x))
0 if R < (1  y)
Table 5: Firm 2s Prots When y>x
Firm 2s prot if Firm 1 pursues:
NCSR CSR-CA CSR-NCA
0 (1  y)   if R < (1  y) (1  x)(1 + (1  y))
0 if R > (1  y)
4 Benchmark Case: Firm 2 cannot invest in CSR
In this section we analyze the benchmark case in which Firm 2 cannot respond to Firm 1 by
investing in CSR. Later, in Section 5 we extend our analysis to the case in which Firm 2 can
invest in CSR as well. By comparing the outcomes of two cases, we will be able to study how a
rm (i.e., in our model Firm 1) can use CSR strategically not just to a¤ect consumerswillingness
to pay for its product, but also to alter its rivals actions.
We begin by rst analyzing the case of no contrast e¤ect. The reason we are doing so is to
understand whether the contrast e¤ect has any signicant impact on the rms CSR strategy.
Lemma 1 When  = 0; Firm 1 prefers to pursue CSR-CA.
When Firm 1 invests in CSR-CA, its R&D success probability increases to one and consumers
willingness to pay for its new product increases by  (i.e., due to CSR). In the absence of the
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contrast e¤ect, when the rm pursues CSR-NCA consumers willingness to pay for its new
product increases by  and when it pursues NCSR, its R&D success probability increases to one.
Therefore, it is obvious that CSR-CA dominates both of the other strategies.
Next, we investigate two cases: Firm 1 is more capable than Firm 2 (i.e., x > y) and Firm 1
is less capable than Firm 2 (i.e., x < y).
We conduct the rest of our analysis with contrast e¤ect present, that is, for  > 0: In the
following we rst characterize the equilibrium for x > y case.
Lemma 2 There exists a R such that for R < R Firm 1 receives zero prots when it pursues
any of the three strategies.
Recall that Firm 2 can only pursue NCSR. Furthermore, since x > y Firm 2 always has
the contrast e¤ect advantage. Therefore, if R is too low Firm 1 will not have any competitive
advantage regardless of whichever strategy it pursues and thus, receive zero prots. For that
reason, to make our analysis meaningful we assume that R > R.
Proposition 1 There exists a Rsuch that Firm 1 chooses to pursue CSR-CA if R > R and
CSR-NCA otherwise.
When  > 0, if Firm 1 invests in CSR-NCA or NCSR, it benets from the contrast e¤ect.
Specically, since consumers think that the rms R&D success probability is equal to x the
gain for consumers from the contrast e¤ect is equal to (1   x): However, if Firm 1 pursues
NCSR it receives zero prots. Remember that the rival is also doing NCSR. This means that
both rms will develop the new product with probability one. Since x > y, consumersgain
from the contrast e¤ect when they buy Firm 2s product is higher than when they buy Firm
1s product. Therefore, Firm 1 will have no competitive advantage when it launches the new
product. Regardless of Firm 1 pursuing either CSR strategy, since x > y, consumersgain from
the contrast e¤ect when they buy Firm 2s product (i.e., (1 y)) is higher than when they buy
Firm 1s product. But, Firm 1s disadvantage from the contrast e¤ect is lower when it pursues
CSR-NCA than when it pursues CSR-CA (i.e., (x   y) vs. (1   y)): On the other hand,
when Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA (CSR-NCA) it enjoys the gain from CSR with probability one
(x). This means that if the gain from CSR () is signicantly higher than the loss in the contrast
e¤ect ((1 x)) then Firm 1 prefers to invest in CSR-CA. In other words, if the ratio of relative
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gain from CSR to the relative gain from the contrast e¤ect is high enough Firm 1 prefers to
invest in CSR-CA and otherwise, Firm 1 prefers to invest in CSR-NCA.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium for x < y case.
Proposition 2 There exist x; R1, R2; and R3 such that
 for x > x; Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA if R > R1, CSR-NCA if R1 > R > R2, and NSCR if
R2 > R
 for x < x; Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA if R > R3 and NCSR otherwise.
Unlike in the case of x > y, now Firm 1 benets from the contrast e¤ect in the amount of
(y x) when it invests in CSR-NCA or in NCSR. That is why, in case of x < y NCSR becomes
a viable strategy. Following the same logic as in Proposition 1, when the gain from CSR is much
higher than the gain from the contrast e¤ect (i.e., for high enough R values) CSR-CA dominates
CSR-NCA and NCSR. On the other hand, for lower R values, Firm 1 prefers either CSR-NCA or
NCSR so that it can gain from the contrast e¤ect. Recall that Firm 1s R&D success probability
is equal to one (x) when it pursues NCSR (CSR-NCA). Thus, if the ratio of the relative gain
from CSR to the relative gain from the contrast e¤ect (i.e., R) is low enough then Firm 1 prefers
to pursue NCSR to increase its chances to gain from the contrast e¤ect. However, for medium
R values and not so low x values it prefers to invest in CSR-NCA.
5 Both rms can invest in CSR
Now, recall that in Section 4, we have investigated the case in which the rm (i.e., Firm 1)
can strategically use CSR to increase the consumerswillingness to pay for its new product and
assumed that the rival (i.e., Firm 2) cannot respond by investing in CSR. In this section, we
relax the assumption that Firm 2 cannot invest in CSR and modify our timeline as follows.
At t=1 Firm 1 decides whether to invest in CSR and if so what kind of CSR. At t=2 Firm 2
decides whether to invest in CSR and if so what kind of CSR. At t=3 rmsR&D outcomes
are realized and they simultaneously set their prices. Finally, at t=4 consumers make their
purchasing decision. This way the rm will be able to use CSR to alter the rivals CSR strategy
as well. Please see Figure 2 for detail timeline of the extended game.
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Figure 2: Timeline of The Game - Both Firms Can Invest in CSR
Firm 1 decides whether
to pursues CSR





Firm 2 decides whether
to pursues CSR





Table 6 lays out consumersutility from Firm 1s new product and from Firm 2s new product
under di¤erent CSR strategies.5
Table 6: Consumersutility from new products under various CSR strategies - both rms can
invest in CSR
Consumersutility from: NCSR CSR-CA CSR-NCA
Firm 1s new product  +  + (1  x)  p1  +  +    p1  +  + (1  x) +    p1
Firm 2s new product  +  + (1  y)  p2  +  +    p2  +  + (1  y) +    p2
As we did in Section 4 we investigate two cases: Firm 1 is more capable than Firm 2 (i.e.,
x > y) and Firm 1 is less capable than Firm 2 (i.e., x < y). For the sake of space we provide
rmsprots in the Appendix.
First, we characterize the equilibrium for x > y case.
Lemma 3 There exists a _R such that for R < _R Firm 1 receives zero prots when it pursues
any of the three strategies.
Since x > y Firm 2 always has the contrast e¤ect advantage. If R is too low, for any strategy
Firm 1 chooses to pursue, NSCR becomes the dominant strategy for Firm 2. In this case, due to
the gain from the contrast e¤ect consumers prefer to buy Firm 2s new product and thus, Firm
1 receives zero prot regardless of the strategy it pursues. For that reason, to make our analysis
meaningful we assume that R > _R.
Proposition 3 There exists a R^ such that Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA if R > R^ and NCSR
otherwise. Firm 2 always pursues CSR-NCA.
5We would like to note that as in Section 4, if  were equal to zero then Firm 1would prefer to pursue CSR-CA.
In this case, Firm 2 would receive zero prot regardless of the strategy it pursues and hence the rm would be
indi¤erent in pursuing any of the three strategies. If we think that Firm 2 would not invest in any of the strategies
then CSR-CA would be the dominant strategy for Firm 1.
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According to Proposition 3, interestingly, when the rival is also capable of investing in CSR,
Firm 1 does not prefer to invest in CSR-NCA and for Firm 2 CSR-NCA is the dominant strategy.
Why does this happen? Unlike the benchmark case, if R is high enough then when Firm 1 invests
in CSR-NCA, Firm 2 responds to that by investing in CSR-CA. Since R is high enough Firm 2
would like to benet from CSR e¤ect as much as possible. Given that Firm 1 is pursuing CSR-
NCA and hence will be successful only with probability x, CSR-CA is the best strategy for Firm
2. On the other hand, when Firm 1 invests in CSR-CA, Firm 2 responds to that by investing in
CSR-NCA. Firm 2 would do so because it would like to pursue one of the CSR strategies, but
if it pursues CSR-CA it will not have any competitive advantage over the rival (i.e., the rms
will be identical). In the former case, Firm 1 will be successful in R&D with probability x and
benet only from the contrast e¤ect. However, in the latter case, Firm 1 will be successful in
R&D with probability one and with probability (1  y) the rival will fail and as a result, Firm 1
will benet from CSR e¤ect. For that reason, for high enough R values Firm 1 prefers to pursue
CSR-CA. If R is low, when Firm 1 invests in CSR-NCA, Firm 2 responds to that by investing in
NCSR. Firm 2 would do so because it will gain more from the contrast e¤ect than the CSR e¤ect
and by pursuing NCSR rather than CSR-NCA it increases its chances of benetting from the
contrast e¤ect. On the other hand, when Firm 1 invests in NCSR, Firm 2 responds to that by
investing in CSR-NCA. Firm 2 would like to benet from the contrast e¤ect as much as possible
given that R is low enough; however as R cannot be too low (R > _R, see Lemma 3) the rm
can benet from the CSR e¤ect by investing in CSR-NCA. In the former case, since x > y Firm
1 will only benet from CSR e¤ect with probability x. However, in the latter case, Firm 1 will
benet from the contrast e¤ect when Firm 2 fails, which happens with probability (1  y). For
low enough R values, the gain from the contrast e¤ect dominates the gain from the CSR e¤ect
and hence, Firm 1 prefers to pursue NCSR.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium for x < y case.
Proposition 4 There exist x^, R^1; R^2; R^3; R^4; and  such that
 for x > x^ and  > ; Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA and Firm 2 pursues CSR-NCA if R > R^1,
Firm 1 pursues CSR-NCA and Firm 2 pursues CSR-CA if R^1 > R > R^2, Firm 1 pursues
CSR-NCA and Firm 2 pursues NCSR if R^2 > R > R^3; and Firm 1 pursues NCSR and
Firm 2 pursues CSR-NCA if R < R^3
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 for x < x^ or  < ; Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA if R > R^4 and NCSR otherwise. Firm 2
always pursues CSR-NCA.
Proposition 4 shows that shows that, unlike the benchmark case, when Firm 2 can invest in
CSR as well, Firm 1 may not pursue CSR-NCA even if x is high (i.e., if x > x^ and  < ):
The intuition for this outcome is as follows. First, note that for these parameter values Firm
1s gain from the contrast e¤ect (which is equal to (1   x) if Firm 2 invests in CSR-CA or
(y   x) if Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA or NCSR) is small. For high enough R values, if Firm 1
pursues CSR-NCA then Firm 2 will pursue CSR-CA. In this case, Firm 1 is able to develop the
new product successfully with probability x and as a result will collect the contrast e¤ect gain
((1   x)). However, if Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA then, given that R is high enoughFirm 2 will
pursue CSR-NCA. In this case, with probability one Firm 1 will successfully develop the new
product and benet from the CSR e¤ect when Firm 2 fails (this happens with probability 1 y).
Obviously, when x is high enough and  is low enough the gain from the CSR e¤ect dominates
the gain from the contrast e¤ect and as a result, Firm 1 prefers to pursue CSR-CA rather than
CSR-NCA. For low R values, if Firm 1 pursues CSR-NCA then Firm 2 will pursue NCSR. In
this case, Firm 1 is able to develop the new product successfully with probability x and as a
result will obtain the contrast e¤ect gain (the expected gain from the contrast e¤ect is equal to
x(y   x)). However, if Firm 1 pursues NCSR then Firm 2 will pursue CSR-NCA. Thus, with
probability one Firm 1 will successfully develop the new product and benet from the contrast
e¤ect gain (the expected gain from the contrast e¤ect is equal to y(y   x) + (1  y)(1  x)).
Since the expected gain from the contrast e¤ect under NCSR is higher than under CSR-NCA
Firm 1 prefers to invest in NCSR.
Note that according to Proposition 4, interestingly there exist parameter values for which
Firm 1, i.e., the rm with lower R&D capability, invests in CSR-NCA while Firm 2, i.e., the rm
with higher R&D capability, invests in CSR-CA or NCSR. This means that the rm with lower
R&D capability prefers to spend its resources not to improve its R&D capabilities and increase
its chance to successfully develop the new product, but to increase the value of its product for
consumers. This happens when x and  are high and R is in medium range. By doing this Firm
1 is benetting from both the contrast e¤ect and the CSR e¤ect as much as possible, but taking
the risk of failing in R&D. However, since x is high enough the risk of failing in R&D is not
so high. Furthermore, since  is high the gain from the contrast e¤ect is high and since R is in
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medium range the gain from the CSR e¤ect is also signicant. Note that if R were high then
Firm 1 would prefer to pursue CSR-CA so that it would increase its chances of benetting from
the CSR e¤ect at the expense of the gain from the contrast e¤ect.
Tables 7-9 summarize the optimal CSR strategy depending on rmsrelative R&D compe-
tence, the ratio of relative gain from CSR to the relative gain from the contrast e¤ect (R), and
the contrast e¤ect sensitivity ().
Table 7: Firm 1 is more capable than Firm 2
R High Low
CSR Strategy Firm 1: CSR-CA Firm 1: NCSR
Firm 2: CSR-NCA Firm 2: CSR-NCA
Table 8: Firm 1 is less capable than Firm 2
Contrast E¤ect Sensitivity - High
R High Medium Low Very Low
CSR Strategy Firm 1: CSR-CA Firm 1: CSR-NCA Firm 1: CSR-NCA Firm 1: NCSR
Firm 2: CSR-NCA Firm 2: CSR-CA Firm 2: NCSR Firm 2: CSR-NCA
Contrast E¤ect Sensitivity - Low
R High Low
CSR Strategy Firm 1: CSR-CA Firm 1: NCSR
Firm 2: CSR-NCA Firm 2: CSR-NCA
Table 9: Firm 1 is much less capable than Firm 2
R High Low
CSR Strategy Firm 1: CSR-CA Firm 1: NCSR
Firm 2: CSR-NCA Firm 2: CSR-NCA
Therefore, our results provide a roadmap regarding when and what type of CSR rms should
invest in. It is obvious that neither type of CSR is dominant strategy. Our results reveal that it
is not enough to pursue a CSR that consumers will appreciate and the decision regarding what
type of CSR to pursue should not be random. Unless consumers punish rms severely for not
engaging in CSR (i.e., unless the cost of not doing CSR is too high) sometimes it is even better
not to engage in CSR. We would like to note that unlike in the previous analytical papers, in
our model it is not the high cost of CSR that discourages a rm to engage in CSR. Our model
goes beyond the cost-based explanation and outlines a strategic reason for not to invest in CSR,
which is via the e¤ect of CSR on consumersperception of the rms R&D capability.
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After characterizing the optimal rm strategies in the following we investigate whether being a
rst mover in CSR is always advantageous or not and whether the rm with an R&D disadvantage
can overcome its competitive disadvantage by being a rst mover in CSR.
Proposition 5 Firm 1s (the rst mover) expected prots are higher than Firm 2s unless y >
x > x^;  > ; and R^1 > R > R^3: Firm 2s (the follower) expected prots are higher than Firm
1s if y > x > x^;  > ; and R^1 > R > R^3:
According to Proposition 5, it is not always advantegous to be a rst mover in CSR. Note
that as we know from Proposition 4 for y > x > x^;  > ; and R^1 > R > R^3 Firm 1 prefers to
pursue CSR-NCA and in all other possible regions it pursues either CSR-CA or NCSR. Therefore,
Proposition 5 implies that if the optimal strategy for the rst mover is to pursue CSR-CA, not
CSR-NCA, then being rst mover in CSR is advantageous and furthermore, the rm with an
R&D disadvantage (i.e., competitively disadvantage) can overcome this and be more protable
than the rival by being the rst mover in investing in CSR. Naturally, one wonders why this
cannot happen when the optimal strategy for the rst mover is CSR-NCA. For y > x > x^;
 > ; and R^1 > R > R^3; Firm 1 invests in CSR-NCA and Firm 2 invests in CSR-CA or in
NCSR. Thus, in the former case Firm 1 does not benet from the CSR e¤ect, but just from
the contrast e¤ect ((1   x)) with probability x: However, Firm 2 will succeed in R&D with
probability one and when Firm 1 fails (happens with probability 1 x), it will receive monopoly
prots and benet from the CSR e¤ect as well. Given that this case happens when R is high
enough (R > R^2); Firm 2s expected prot is higher than Firm 1s expected prot. In the latter
case, Firm 2 will succeed in R&D with probability one and when Firm 1 fails (happens with
probability 1   x), it will receive monopoly prots and benet from the contrast e¤ect as well.
Since this case happens for lower R values (R^2 > R > R^3), Firm 2s expected prot is higher
than Firm 1s expected prot.
Proposition 6 Firm 1 benets from CSR more when x < y than when x > y.
So far, we have established that a rm (i.e., Firm 1 in our model) can use CSR strategically to
a¤ect both the consumerswillingness to pay for its product and the rivals actions. According
to Proposition 6, a rm benets from strategic CSR more when it has lower R&D capability
than its rival. First, regardless of x < y or x > y for high R values the rst mover invests in
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CSR-CA and the follower invests in CSR-NCA and for low R values the rst mover invests in
NCSR and the follower invests in CSR-NCA. However, for medium R values the rst mover may
follow a di¤erent strategy depending on x < y or x > y. Note that the more capable rm cannot
gain from the contrast e¤ect. That is why when x > y, CSR-CA strategy dominates CSR-NCA
strategy for the upper medium values of R and NCSR strategy dominates CSR-NCA strategy for
the lower medium values of R. In either case, as we know from Proposition 3, the follower pursues
CSR-NCA. Therefore, in the upper medium R values, the rst mover only benets from the CSR
e¤ect when the follower fails to develop the new product. But, as we know from Proposition
4, the less capable rst mover (i.e., x < y) prefers to invest in CSR-NCA for these medium R
values if x and  are high enough. In that case, the follower chooses to pursue CSR-CA and as
a result, the rst mover will gain from the contrast e¤ect with probability x: Since x and  are
high and R is not too high the rst movers expected prot is higher when x < y than when
x > y.
Next, we discuss the testable implications of our model and make suggestions for future
empirical work.
5.1 Testable implications of the model
First, our theoretical model has three parameters that a¤ect the normative predictions. First,
we have the R&D success probability of each rm as x or y. The empirical measure for this
can be R&D investments, the number of patents a rm has obtained, or product innovations.
For example, Surroca et al. (2010) use the ratio of R&D expenses to a rms total number of
employees as the measure for R&D capability. Second parameter is , the increase in willingness
to pay for a product due to CSR activity being performed by a rm. The measure for this can be
attained either by a direct survey like a conjoint study or by observing average prices before and
after CSR activities have been initiated. A dummy variable for CSR activity can capture the
impact of CSR on price beyond attributes like advertising, product quality, etc. Finally, we have
 which measures sensitivity to the contrast e¤ect. The contrast e¤ect will be greater in less
turbulent industries (those which do not often see innovations). This is because  captures how
sensitive consumers are to an R&D surprise. In more turbulent industries, where innovations
are more frequent, the contrast e¤ect will be smaller. So  for consumer packaged goods will be
more than that for tech industries. Hence it is fair to assume that , the measure of sensitivity
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to contrast e¤ect, is specic to an industry. Thus, we suggest that one can measure  as the
ratio of the number of innovations to the number of companies in an industry.
Once the values of these four parameters are measured one can test the following hypotheses:
1. A rm is better o¤ in investing in CSR-CA when the ratio of 

is high. Recall that 
is the value of the product innovation for consumers (i.e., consumerswillingness to pay for the
updates/improvements in the product).
2. When the ratio of 

is low, it is better for a rm to invest in CSR-NCA if the rm has
higher R&D capability than its rival and the rival is not capable of investing in CSR and not
invest in CSR at all otherwise. This means that the analysis should include a dummy variable
for whether the rms R&D capability is higher than the rivals or not.
3. It is more protable to invest in CSR-NCA rather than in CSR-CA if the ratio of 

is in
medium values and the rival is more capable than the rm, but the rms R&D capability is not
so low either.
We would like to note that the empirical analysis should be done by controlling for the cost of
not investing in CSR. Specically, in some industries/markets there might be legal requirements
to invest in CSR or investing in CSR may be a general norm and hence it may not be feasible
for a rm not to engage in CSR at all. India for example has recently passed a law which
requires companies to spend 2% of their net prot on activities related to CSR. Indonesia also
has a law for companies carrying out activities in the natural resources sector to participate in
environmental social responsibility program. In those cases when testing the hypothesis 2 above,
one should test whether investing more than the minimum required amount in CSR is better or
not.
6 Experiment
We designed an experiment to support a key assumption in our model regarding contrast e¤ect.
The key objective of our study was to test the impact of CSR-CA and CSR-NCA on consumers
target product evaluations. In our model we assume that consumers assess a new product
developed by a rm who has invested in CSR-CA less favorably than a product developed by a
company with CSR-NCA activities.
Pretest
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A pretest was conducted to validate our manipulation of CSR type. One hundred and forty-
ve MTurk participants from North America were randomly assigned to one of the following
conditions.
In the CSR-CA condition, the scenario read ZENET Corporation develops and manufactures
electronic testing equipment. The company o¤ers several consumer and industrial products.
ZENET has recently initiated the Skill Enhancement Initiative for its women and minorities
employees. This initiative provides training for the CURRENT employees in the use of the latest
production and manufacturing technologies. This has made the female and minority employees
more comfortable in their work environment. The turnover rate in this group has dropped to
a meager 3%, as compared to industry average of 20%.
In the CSR-NCA condition, participants saw the following scenario about the company.
ZENET Corporation develops and manufactures electronic testing equipment. The company
o¤ers several consumer and industrial products. ZENET has recently undertaken the Feed the
Children Initiative inBangladesh in an e¤ort to provide breakfast and lunch at schools in major
cities. In the schools where the initiative has been implemented, attendance has improved
by 50% (as compared to a mere 40% in schools that do not have such initiatives) and over 70%
of the children have gone ahead to High School. (scenarios adapted from Brown and Dacin
(1997)).
Next, participants rated the following three statements about the expected company produc-
tivity as a result of CSR investments on a 7-point scale.  I believe that such social responsibility
actions have direct implications for the companys ability., I believe that such social responsi-
bility e¤orts will improve the companys productivity., I believe that such social responsibility
e¤orts will improve the rms technological innovativeness.(1 = Strongly Disagree 7 = Strongly
Agree). These measures were highly correlated ( = .84) and we combined them into a produc-
tivity index. Finally, we assessed our respondentsexpectations from a new product by ZENET
with the following item. If ZENET launches a new product, I would expect it to be of a high
quality(1 = Strongly Disagree 7 = Strongly Agree).
As we expected, participants in the CSR-CA condition rated the productivity of the company
to be signicantly higher than those who were in the CSR-NCA condition, demonstrating that
our manipulation works as intended (MCSR-CA = 5.25, SD = 1.14; MCSR-NCA = 4.69, SD =
1.24; F(1, 143) = 8.32, p < .01). Moreover, participants anticipate a signicantly higher quality
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product from a rm who invests in CSR-CA rather than CSR-NCA (MCSR-CA = 5.20, SD =
1.33; MCSR-NCA = 4.71, SD = 1.45; F(1, 143) = 4.48, p = .04).
Main Study
One hundred and fty-two MTurk participants from North America were randomly assigned to
one of the scenarios tested in the above pretest (CSR-CA vs. CSR-NCA). Next, all participants
read a description about QUANTEK A25, a new product developed by ZENET Corporation.
QUANTEK A25 is a device that can measure and monitor basic vital statistics, including
respiration, heart rate, blood pressure, and temperature. QUANTEK A25 has been examined
in independent tests by Consumers Union, Consumers Digest magazine, and Underwriters
Laboratory. Unit was rated as average. Users noted some convenience with the unit as it
combines several functions into one small unit. Next we asked our respondents to take a moment
and imagine they are on the market to buy such a product and rate the extent to which they
agree with the following three statements on a 7-point scale. My attitude towards QUANTEK
25 is bad/good; negative/positive; unfavorable/favorable.These items were highly correlated
( = .83). Therefore, we combined them into a new product evaluation index.
Results reveal that participants in the CSR-CA condition evaluated the new product less
favorably than participants in the CSR-NCA condition (MCSR-CA = 3.38, SD = 1.24; MCSR-
NCA = 4.27, SD = 1.22; F(1, 150) = 20.83, p < .01),demonstrating the expected contrast
e¤ect.
Discussion
In line with the literature on the contextual inuence on target product evaluations, we have
documented a contrast e¤ect as a result of a discrepancy between the judgment standard and
actual performance (Herr et al., 1983; Herr, 1986; Lynch et al., 1991). Our experiment shows
that if a rm invests in CSR-CA, consumers believe that its productivity and manufacturing
capabilities will improve; therefore a new product by the rm will be of a better quality than a
product by a company with a CSR-NCA investment. When the new product is an average item,
however, consumer evaluations are signicantly less favorable when the product is by a rm that
invests in CSR-CA. Note that contrast e¤ects occur only after some deliberation that is needed
to correct for the assimilatory power of the context (Herr, 1986; Meyers and Tybout, 1997).
Exposure to extreme exemplars induces contrast e¤ects since such exemplars alert participants
and diminishes the biasing inuence of the context (Herr et al., 1983). Therefore, when the new
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product by the rm investing in CSR-CA is rated as average, this results in a divergence from
the expected, leading to contrast e¤ects.
7 Conclusion
Our paper was motivated by the fact that rms in various markets spend signicant amounts
of money on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. However, it is not clear from the
current literature if it is always protable for the rm to invest in CSR activities. This paper
therefore sets out to address this fundamental question.
Broadly, there are two main types of CSR activities, company ability relevant (CSR-CA) and
company ability irrelevant CSR (CSR-NCA). Consumerswillingness to pay for a rms products
increases when they observe that the rm invests in CSR, of either type. But, when a rm invests
in CSR-CA, it helps to improve the rms R&D and manufacturing capabilities, which in turn
increases the rms success probability in new product development. On the other hand, CSR-
NCA does not inuence corporate ability. Unlike CSR-NCA, CSR-CA has two conicting e¤ects
on a consumers utility. While the direct e¤ect (i.e., willing to pay extra for the product which is
produced by a rm that invests in CSR) is positive, the indirect e¤ect (i.e., the contrast e¤ect)
is negative due to the increase in consumersexpectation of the rms ability to develop a higher
quality new product. When a rm is deciding whether to invest in CSR and if so, of what kind,
it should take into consideration how its decision will a¤ect its R&D capability and as a result
consumerswillingness to pay for its new product. This implies that if a rm ignores the indirect
e¤ect of CSR it may make an ine¢ cient CSR decision, which can lead to reduced prots.
We construct an analytical model in which there are two rms, with asymmetric R&D capa-
bilities, working on developing a new product. Each rm has a xed budget to spend either on
pure R&D or on CSR activity. We analyze two scenarios; one where the rival can only invest
in R&D whereas the focal rm can choose between R&D and CSR of either type, second where
both rms can choose between R&D and CSR of either type.
If there is no contrast e¤ect CSR-CA is the dominant strategy for the focal rm. With the
contrast e¤ect present and the rival rm unable to invest in CSR, if the focal rm is more capable
in R&D than the rival, it prefers to pursue CSR-CA if the relative gain from CSR is higher than
the relative gain from the contrast e¤ect and CSR-NCA otherwise. When the focal rm is less
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capable than the rival, unless its R&D capability is too low, it pursues CSR-CA if the ratio of
the relative gain from CSR to the relative gain from the contrast e¤ect is high, CSR-NCA if the
ratio of the relative gain from CSR to the relative gain from the contrast e¤ect is medium, and
NCSR if the ratio of the relative gain from CSR to the relative gain from the contrast e¤ect is
low. However, when the rm is less capable than the rival and its R&D capability is low enough,
it prefers to pursue CSR-CA if the relative gain from CSR is higher than the relative gain from
the contrast e¤ect and NCSR otherwise. When the rival can invest in CSR, we nd that the
rm tends to abandon CSR-NCA strategy. Specically, when the rm is more capable in R&D
than the rival, it prefers to pursue CSR-CA if the relative gain from CSR is higher than the
relative gain from the contrast e¤ect and NCSR otherwise. When the rm is less capable and
its R&D capability is not too low it will not pursue CSR-NCA, unless the consumerssensitivity
to contrast e¤ect is high enough. In this case, it pursues CSR-CA if the relative gain from
CSR is higher than the relative gain from the contrast e¤ect, and NCSR otherwise. Thus, our
results reveal that a rm can strategically use CSR to alter both consumers behavior as well
as a competitors behavior. We observe that only under certain conditions it is advantegous
to be a rst mover in CSR-invesment and under these conditions by being the rst mover in
CSR-investment the rm can even overcome its competitive disadvantage in R&D. Our analysis
additionally reveals that the competitively disadvantaged rm benets from CSR more than the
competitively advantaged rm.
7.1 Limitations and Directions for Further Research
In our model we assume that when a rm pursues NCSR consumers do not update their prior
belief about that rms R&D capability. We could have alternatively modeled such that a rm
receives an R&D endowment with some probability, which is unobservable to consumers unless
the rm engages in CSR or truthfully reveals this. In that case, the rival may or may not know
whether the rm has received an R&D endowment. In the former case, due to the gain from the
contrast e¤ect unless the rm nds it protable to invest in CSR it would never prefer to reveal
that it has received an R&D endowment. However, the rivals CSR strategy may reveal to the
consumers whether the rm has received an R&D endowment and is pursuing NCSR. Since the
rival prefers the rm not to benet from the contrast e¤ect this signaling feature of its own CSR
strategy may a¤ect its decision. This means that unless the rivals action reveals whether the
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rm is pursuing NCSR, for consumers the probability of the rm pursuing NCSR would be less
than one. If the rival does not know whether the rm has received an R&D endowment then
the rm would be concerned about whether to reveal or not that it is pursuing NSCR. Even
though the rm does not want to reveal to the consumers that it is pursuing NCSR to benet
from the contrast e¤ect it may want its rival to know this so as to a¤ect the rivals choice of
strategy to its favor. Naturally, if there is no way of credibly communicating that the rm is
pursuing NCSR strategy then for consumers the probability of the rm pursuing NCSR would
be less than one. In either case, a rms CSR strategy would have a signaling value regarding
whether it has received an R&D endowment or not. This feature of the model would however
immensely complicate the present analysis.
There are several directions in which this research can be taken further. We have modeled
a Stackelberg game where the focal rm is the leader and the competitor is the follower. It
would be meaningful to model a situation where the rms set their respective CSR strategies
simultaneously, that is, neither rm learns what the other is doing prior to choosing its own
strategy. We have also considered that the production costs for the products are symmetric
across the two rms. It would be helpful to learn the role of costs in the CSR decision making
process by building in cost heterogeneity in the model. When both rms can decide on whether
to follow CSR or NCSR, the competitor learns of Firm 1s choice prior to making its own. The
rm can credibly reveal that it has adopted CSR. If the rm does not reveal that it is doing
CSR, then the default strategy is to pursue NCSR. Future research can consider mechanisms
which would allow rms to credibly commit to either NCSR or one of those CSR strategies that
we have discussed in this paper.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Since  is zero when Firm 1 pursues any of the CSR strategies, consumers utility from its new
product will be equal to  + +   p1 and when Firm 1 pursues NCSR, consumers utility from
its new product will be equal to  +    p1: Note that when Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA or NCSR
its R&D success probability is equal to one and when it pursues CSR-NCA its R&D success
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probability is equal to x. Since Firm 2 can only pursue NCSR its R&D success probability is
equal to one and consumers utility from its new product will be equal to +   p2. This means
that if Firm 1 pursues NCSR then both rmsprots will be equal to zero. However, if Firm 1
pursues CSR-CA then its expected prot is equal to  and if it pursues CSR-NCA its expected
prot is equal to x: For that reason, Firm 1 prefers to invest in CSR-CA.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Since x > y and Firm 2 is bound to pursue NCSR (that means consumers utility from its new
product will be equal to  +  + (1  y)  p2) Firm 1 will never gain from the contrast e¤ect.
Therefore, when Firm 1 pursues NCSR, consumers utility from its new product will be equal to
+ +(1 x) p1 and hence its prot will be equal to zero. However, if it invests in CSR-CA
then consumers utility from its new product will be equal to  +  +    p1 and if it invests in
CSR-NCA then consumers utility from its new product will be equal to ++(1 x)+ p1:
Obviously, if  < (x  y) then Firm 1 will receive zero prots from any of the three strategies.
As a result, it would not want to spend its R&D endowment. Given that R  

; only for
R > R = (x  y) Firm 1 would nd it to protable to pursue one of the three strategies.
Proof of Proposition 1:
As we show in the proof of Lemma 2 it is not protable to pursue NCSR. If Firm 1 pursues
CSR-CA then its expected prot is equal to  (1  y) and if Firm 1 pursues CSR-NCA then
its expected prot is equal to x(   (x  y)): Therefore, Firm 1 prefers to invest in CSR-CA
if R > R = 1 + x  y and prefers to invest in CSR-NCA otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Firm 1s expected prot is CSR CA;1 =    (1   y) if R > 1   y and CSR CA;1 = 0
otherwise; CSR NCA;1 = x( + (y   x)); and NCSR;1 = (y   x) when it pursues CSR-CA,
CSR-NCA, and NCSR respectively.
One can show that if x > y
2
: for R > 1+ x  y, CSR CA;1 > max fCSR NCA;1; NCSR;1g ; for
1 + x   y > R > (1 x)(y x)
x
; CSR NCA;1 > max fCSR CA;1; NCSR;1g ; and for (1 x)(y x)x > R;
NCSR;1 > max fCSR CA;1; CSR NCA;1g :
If x < y
2
: for R > 1   x; CSR CA;1 > max fCSR NCA;1; NCSR;1g and for R < 1   x;
NCSR;1 > max fCSR CA;1; CSR NCA;1g :
FirmsProts: For Lemma 3, Propositions 3 and 4
In the following we will provide rmsprot expressions and the solution for what is the best
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strategy for a rm when its rival is pursuing NCSR, CSR-CA, or CSR-NCA respectively. By
using this general characterization we will prove Lemma 3, and Propositions 3 and 4.
Let zo and zr denote own R&D capability and the rivals R&D capability respectively.
If the rival is pursuing NCSR:
Case of zr > zo : the rms expected prot is CSR CA =    (1  zr) if R > (1  zr) and
CSR CA = 0 otherwise; CSR NCA = zo( + (zr   zo)); and NCSR = (zr   zo).
Case of zo > zr : the rms expected prot is CSR CA =    (1  zr) if R > (1  zr) and
CSR CA = 0 otherwise; CSR NCA = zo(   (zo   zr)) if R > (zo   zr) and CSR NCA = 0
otherwise; and NCSR = 0.
What is the best strategy for a rm if the rival is pursuing NCSR?:
For R > 1 : if zr > zo then CSR-CA, if zo > zr and R > 1 + zo   zr then CSR-CA, and if
zo > zr and R < 1 + zo   zr then CSR-NCA.
For 1 > R > zo and zo > 12 : if zr > zo and R > 1 + zo   zr then CSR-CA, if zr > zo and
R < 1 + zo   zr then CSR-NCA, and if zo > zr then CSR-NCA.
If zo > R > max f1  zo; zo   zrg and zo > 12 then CSR-NCA.
If zo zr > R > 1 zo and zo > 12 then the rm is indi¤erent because it receives zero revenues
under each strategy. Thus, the rm should not invest at all.
For 1   zo > R and zo > 12 : if zr > zo and R > (1 zo)(zr zo)zo then CSR-NCA, if zr > zo and
R < (1 zo)(zr zo)
zo
then NCSR, if zo > zr > zo   R then CSR-NCA, and if zo   zr > R then the
rm should not invest at all.
For zo < 12 and 1 > R > 1  zo : if zr > zo and R > 1 + zo   zr then CSR-CA, if zr > zo and
R < 1 + zo   zr then CSR-NCA, if zo > zr and R > 1 + zo   zr then CSR-CA, if zo > zr and
zo   zr < R < 1 + zo   zr then CSR-NCA, and if zo > zr and zo   zr > R then the rm should
not invest at all.
For zo < 12 and 1   zo > R > zo : if zr > zo and R > (1 zo)(zr zo)zo then CSR-NCA, if zr > zo
and R < (1 zo)(zr zo)
zo
then NCSR, and if zo > zr then CSR-CA.
For zo < 12 and zo > R : if zr > zo and R >
(1 zo)(zr zo)
zo
then CSR-NCA, if zr > zo and
R < (1 zo)(zr zo)
zo
then NCSR, if zo > zr > zo   R then CSR-NCA, and if zo   zr > R then the
rm should not invest at all.
If the rival is pursuing CSR-CA:
The rms expected prot is CSR CA = 0; CSR NCA = zo(1   zo); and NCSR = (1  
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zo)   if R < (1  zo) and NCSR = 0 otherwise.
What is the best strategy for a rm if the rival is pursuing CSR-CA?:
If R > (1  zo)2 then CSR-NCA and R < (1  zo)2 then NCSR.
If the rival is pursuing CSR-NCA:
Case of zr > zo : the rms expected prot is CSR CA = (1   zr)( + ); CSR NCA =
zo((1 zr)(+(1 zo)+)+zr(zr zo)); and NCSR = (1 zr)(+(1 zo))+zr((zr zo) )
if R < (zr   zo) and NCSR = (1  zr)( + (1  zo)) otherwise.
Case of zo > zr : the rms expected prot is CSR CA = (1   zr)( + ); CSR NCA =
zo(1  zr)( + (1  zo) + ), and NCSR = (1  zr)( + (1  zo)).
What is the best strategy for a rm if the rival is pursuing CSR-NCA?:




(1 zr)(1 zo) then CSR-NCA, and if zo > zr then CSR-CA.
For R < (1   zo) : if zr > zo + R and  > (1 zo)(1 zr+(1 zo zr(1 zr))zr+zo(1 zr) then CSR-NCA, if














(1 zr)zo then NCSR, and if zo > zr then NCSR.
Proof of Lemma 3:
If x > (2  y)y then for R < (1  y)2 Firm 1s expected prot from any of the three strategies
is zero. If x < (2   y)y then for R < (1 y)(x y)
y
Firm 1s expected prot from any of the three
strategies is zero. Note that (1   y)2 > (1 y)(x y)
y
if x < (2   y)y and (1   y)2 < (1 y)(x y)
y
otherwise. Thus, for Firm 1 to receive positive prot from at least one of the three strategies R






Proof of Proposition 3:
For x > (2 y)y and R > (1 y)2 Firm 1 invests in CSR-CA and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA.
For x < (2  y)y: if R > (1  x) Firm 1 invests in CSR-CA and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA
and if (1  x) > R > (1 y)(y x)
y
Firm 1 invests in NCSR and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA.
Proof of Proposition 4:
For x > 1  y and  > 1 y
(1 x)(x+y 1) : if R >
x(1 x)  (1 y)

1 y Firm 1 invests in CSR-CA and Firm
2 invests in CSR-NCA, if x(1 x) 
(1 y)

1 y > R > (1   y) Firm 1 invests in CSR-NCA and Firm





Firm 1 invests in CSR-NCA and Firm





Firm 1 invests in NCSR and Firm 2 invests in
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CSR-NCA.
For x > 1   y and  < 1 y
(1 x)(x+y 1) : if R > 1   x Firm 1 invests in CSR-CA and Firm 2
invests in CSR-NCA and if R < 1  x Firm 1 invests in NCSR and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA.
For x < 1  y : if R > 1  x Firm 1 invests in CSR-CA and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA and
if R < 1  x Firm 1 invests in NCSR and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Let 1 and 2 denote Firm 1s and Firm 2s expected prot respectively.
In equilibrium, Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA and Firm 2 pursues CSR-NCA if x > (2   y)y and
R > (1 y)2; if y < x < (2 y)y and R > 1 x; if x < y < 1 x and R > 1 x; if y > x > 1 y;
 > 1 y
(1 x)(x+y 1) ; and R >
x(1 x)  (1 y)

1 y , or if y > x > 1  y;  < 1 y(1 x)(x+y 1) ; and R > 1  x: In
this case, 1 = (1  y)( + ) and 2 = y(1  y): Since 1 +  > y; 1 > 2.





1 y > R > (1 y): In this case, 1 = (1 x)x and 2 = (1 x)(+):
Since 1 + 

> x; 2 > 1.
In equilibrium Firm 1 pursues CSR-NCA and Firm 2 pursues NCSR if y > x > 1   y;
 > 1 y





: In this case, 1 = x( + (y   x)) and





> (1  y); 2 > 1.







> R; if y > x > 1   y;  < 1 y
(1 x)(x+y 1) ; and 1   x > R; if
x < y < 1  x and 1  x > R; or if x < (2  y)y and (1  x) > R > (1 y)(x y)
y
:






> R then 1  (1  y)(+ (1  x)) and
2  y(   (y   x)): Since R < (1   y); 1 > 2: If y > x > 1   y;  < 1 y(1 x)(x+y 1) ; and
1 x > R then 1  (1  y)(+(1 x)) and 2  y( (y x)): Since 1 x > R; 1 > 2:
If x < y < 1   x and 1   x > R then 1  (1   y)( + (1   x)) and 2  y(   (y   x)):
Since 1   x > R; 1 > 2: If y < x < (2   y)y and (1   x) > R > (1 y)(x y)y then 1 =
(1  y)( + (1  x)) and 2 = y( + (y   x)): Since 1  x > R; 1 > 2:
Proof of Proposition 6:
As we know from the proof of Proposition 3, when Firm 1 is the more capable rm (i.e.,
x > y), it pursues CSR-CA if x > (2  y)y and R > (1  y)2 or if x < (2  y)y and R > (1  x):
This means that Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA if R > max f(1  x); (1  y)2g : In this case, Firm 2
prefers to pursue CSR-NCA and hence 1 = (1  y)( + ):
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As we know from the proof of Proposition 4, when Firm 1 is less capable rm (i.e., x < y), it
pursues CSR-CA if x > 1 y,  > 1 y
(1 x)(x+y 1) ; andR >
x(1 x)  (1 y)

1 y , if x > 1 y,  < 1 y(1 x)(x+y 1) ;
















1 y ; (1  y)2

then Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA both
when x < y and when x > y. In either case, Firm 2 prefers to pursue CSR-NCA and hence
1 = (1  y)( + ):
If x > 1 y and  > 1 y
(1 x)(x+y 1) then for x > y and R > max f1  x; (1  y)2g Firm 1 pursues
CSR-CA, but for x < y and x(1 x) 
(1 y)

1 y > R > max f1  x; (1  y)2g Firm 1 pursues CSR-NCA.
In the latter case, Firm 2 prefers to pursue CSR-CA and hence 1 = x(1  x): One can show




If y > x > 1  y and  > 1 y











Firm 1 pursues NCSR), but if x > y then for R < (1   x)
Firm 1 pursues NCSR.
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